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AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: COLLISION COURSE OR COOPERATION?
CHARLES CHERNOR JALLOH*
I. INTRODUCTION
It gives me great pleasure to speak with you this evening on one of
the most important questions for the success, and indeed the future, of
the International Criminal Court (ICC). As you probably know, in
terms of significance for international law, the ICC is arguably the
most important international institution to be established in the 20th
century since the creation of the United Nations in 1945. Its creation
has therefore been described as a "Grotian" or watershed moment for
international law. My presentation focuses on developments in Af-
rica, the experimental farm for the ICC, since the Court's establish-
ment in July 2002.
By way of a roadmap, I will start, firstly, by providing some back-
ground about the African role in the global struggle for international
justice, especially the establishment of the ICC. As part of this, I will
highlight the continent's efforts to ensure human security, in the after-
math of the Cold War. I suggest that the establishment of the African
Union (AU), the regional body comprised of all countries on the con-
tinent excepting Morocco, is an integral part of this trend.
In the second part of my remarks, I will examine the key concerns
raised by the AU about the ICC's recent work in Africa. In this re-
gard, I focus specifically on the fallout from the Sudan situation, in
particular, the issuance of an arrest warrant for Sudanese President
Omar al Bashir. I show that concern over the sequencing of peace
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and justice in the Sudan situation is the main reason why various Afri-
can leaders and some scholars now perceive the Court as nothing
more than the new imperialism masquerading as international rule of
law.
However, I generally contest the proposition that the Court is noth-
ing more than a Western imperialist project. Thus, in the third part of
my remarks, I argue that both the ICC and Africa, as represented by
the AU, share a mutual interest in addressing heinous international
crimes. In my view, there is therefore a mutual gain, or "win-win" in
the long-term, or conversely, a "mutual vulnerability", or "lose-lose",
for both the Court and Africa should they fail to cooperate in the
short-term.
In the conclusion, I tentatively assess the current impasse between
the ICC and the continent. Here, I raise concerns about the legal va-
lidity, or lack thereof, of the AU decision not to cooperate with the
ICC, which was adopted at Sirte, Libya in July 2009.' That decision
was reiterated by the Summit of African Heads of States meeting in
Kampala, Uganda on July 25, 2010 and clearly goes against the spirit
of accountability that is needed in Sudan.2
II. BACKGROUND INTO THE AFRICAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE
EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Africa, as a continent, supported the idea of the ICC long before its
birth, in fact, while the ICC concept was in gestation in the belly of the
international community.
As some of you may know, on February 2, 1999, Senegal became
the first country in the world to ratify the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (the Rome Statute).' Senegal's speedy ratifica-
tion symbolically capped African State support for a permanent ICC
having jurisdiction over the "most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole."' The historic ratification by the
1. Assembly of the African Union [AU Assembly], Decision on the Meeting of African
States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Assembly/AU/
Dec.245(XIII) Rev.1, T 10, at 2, Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII) (July 3, 2009, 13th Ordinary Ses-
sion of the Assembly in Sirte), available at http://www.au.int/en/decisions/assembly.
2. AU Assembly, Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementa-
tion of Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.270(XIV) on the Second Ministerial Meeting on the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Assembly/AU/Dec.296(XV) $ 5 at 1, Doc.
Assembly/AU/10(XV) (July 27, 2010, 15th Ordinary Session. of the Assembly in Kampala),
available at http://www.au.int/en/decisions/assembly.
3. U.N., Treatises and International Agreements Registered or Filed and Recorded with the
Secretariat of the United Nations Vol. 2187, 1-38544, 6 (2004), http://treaties.un.org/doc/publica-
tion/UNTS/Volume%202187/v2187.pdf.
4. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Preamble, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter Rome
Statute].
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West African state, from amongst a group of 120 countries that signed
the ICC Statute at its adoption in Rome on July 17, 1998, demon-
strated a keen awareness of the significance that the accomplishments
of the ICC would imply for the world as a whole and for Africa in
particular.
Indeed, as Professor Tiya Maluwa, the legal advisor to the Organi-
zation of African Unity (OAU) observed during the Rome negotia-
tions, the continent of Africa had a special interest in the
establishment of the ICC because its people had for centuries endured
human rights atrocities such as slavery, colonial wars and other hor-
rific acts of war and violence which continue today despite the conti-
nent's post-colonial phase.'
Furthermore, fresh memories of the tragic and "preventable"6 1994
Rwandan Genocide, in which the international community was fore-
warned about genocide but chose not to act, strengthened Africa's re-
solve to support the idea of an independent and effective international
court that would punish, and hopefully deter, perpetrators of such hei-
nous crimes in the future. Not surprisingly, the continent went on to
play a significant and constructive role in the Rome negotiations that
ultimately led to creation of the Court.'
Today, over a decade after the Rome Statute was adopted, African
countries, many of which are either embroiled in devastating conflicts
or newly emergent from them, have continued to invest their yearn-
ings for peace and stability in the hope that the freshly minted ICC
will become a success story, and one that will benefit them."
There are, as of this writing, 115 States Parties to the Rome Statute,
although that number is bound to change upwards over the next few
years.' Of all the world's regions, Africa has generated the largest sup-
port base for the Court at thirty-one (31) ratifying states. One of the
most recent ratifications was from the African island nation of Sey-
5. Plenary, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court. See UN, Statement Delivered by Tiyanjana Maluwa,
OAU Legal Counsel, (17 June 1998), http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm.
6. International Panel of Eminent Personalities, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, Or-
ganization of African Unity (July 7, 2000).
7. Hassan Jallow & Fatou Bensouda, International criminal law in an African Context, in
AFRICAN GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 15, 41-3 (Max du Plessis ed., 2008). See
also Phakiso Mochochoko, Africa and the International Criminal Court, in AFRICAN PERSPEC-
TIVIS ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Evelyn A. Ankumah & Edward K. Kwakwa eds.,
2005); Sivu Maqungo, The establishment of the International Criminal Court: SADC's participa-
tion in the negotiations, 9 AFR. SFC. Rrv. 42, 42-53 (2000).
8. Charles Chernor Jalloh, Regionalizing International Criminal Law?, 9 INT'L CRIM. L.
REV. 445, 447 (2009).
9. For a current and complete list of States Parties, see, ICC, The States Parties to the Rome
Statute, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/statesiarties/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2012) [hereinafter
States Parties].
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chelles. 0 The number of states constitutes over half of the continent's
fifty-three (53) countries. Thirteen additional African nations have
signed the Rome treaty." To contextualize these numbers, Africa is
followed by 25 states from Western Europe, 24 from Latin America
and the Caribbean, 18 from Eastern Europe and only 15 from Asia.12
However, in my view, the significance of the continent's strong en-
dorsement of the ICC is not adequately reflected by the numbers of
African States that have endorsed the Court. It is better captured by
the reality that countries in Africa are likely to be the frequent users,
or what I call the "repeat customers," of the Court because of two
main factors: 1) a relatively higher prevalence of conflicts and serious
human rights violations, and 2) a general lack of credible legal systems
to address them.
To appreciate the significance of the African support for the ICC in
the broader geopolitical context, despite serious hostilities in which
international crimes are routinely committed, countries in the Middle
East and the Arab World have displayed little enthusiasm for the ICC,
including, notably, Libya, the Arab North African target of the ICC's
most recent United Nations Security Council referral.' 3 This is fur-
ther exemplified by the fact that, to date, only one state from that
entire region, Jordan, is today a party to the Rome treaty.14 Again, it
is hoped that this situation will change in the future and that other
countries from that conflict ridden region will also choose to join the
Court.
Even more significantly, of the six situations currently under formal
ICC investigation by the Prosecutor, all are in Africa,'s not to mention
recent prosecutorial murmurings about a potential future investiga-
tion into "alleged mass killings" in Ivory Coast in West Africa.' 6 Of
the six, three (Central African Republic (CAR), Uganda, and the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)) reflect the continent's wide
embrace of the Court. The former three, all of which are contracting
parties, broke the ice of impunity by successively giving work to the
ICC through so-called "self-referrals" of their respective situations for
10. [CC, Seychelles ratifies the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Press Re-
leases 2010 (11.08.2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/.
11. ICC, African States, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states$arties/African+States/
(last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
12. States Parties, supra note 9.
13. See SC Res. 1970, $1 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
14. States Parties, supra note 9.
15. See ICC, Situations and cases, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/
(last visited Feb. 26, 2012) (listing ICC's cases, with relevant documentation).
16. Statement, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, Widespread or systematic killings in Cote
dIvoire may trigger OTP investigation (06.04.2011), http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/85A578
D5-946A-44C3-9908-1C2243062EF0.htm.
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investigations and prosecutions.' In doing so, those nations put
themselves more directly on the line to offer the first test cases to an
untested court. This can be contrasted with the Sudan and, more re-
cently Libya, both of which were recalcitrant and opposed to the ICC.
Perhaps because they were imposed on those states by the UN Secur-
ity Council acting under its mandate to ensure the maintenance of
international peace and security."s
More recently, before the Prosecutor controversially applied to use
his proprio motu power,' 9 Kenya had actually indicated its willingness
to refer the 2007-2008 post-election violence, in which up to 1,200 peo-
ple were killed in less than three months, to the ICC.2 0 Its position
has, however, been somewhat un-supportive since Prosecutor Luis
Moreno-Ocampo announced a list of suspects at the end of 2010,
three of whom have already made pre-trial appearances before the
court.21
Since the Cold War ended, the prosecution of international crimes
has been high on the agenda of African States. For instance, under
Article 4(h) of the AU's Constitutive Act, member states ceded to the
regional body the right to intervene in their territories based on a de-
cision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.2 2 The same clause was
subsequently reiterated in other AU legal instruments, most notably
Article 7(1)(e) of the Peace and Security Protocol.23
17. See Claus Kress,'Self Referrals' and 'Waivers of Complementarity': Some Considerations
in Law and Policy, 2 J. INr'L CRIM. JUST. 944 (2004); Paola Gaeta, Is the Practice of 'Self-Refer-
rals' a Sound Start for the ICC?, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 949 (2004).
18. Neither Sudan nor Libya is a Party to the Rome Statute. Although Kenya is in fact a
Party, its government has expressed scepticism about the prudence of initiating ICC proceedings
against the alleged perpetrators of the 2007 post-election violence including, for example, in the
Dec. 22, 2010 Parliamentary resolution calling for a withdrawal from the Rome Statute. As of
Apr. 8, 2011, the Kenyan government had not begun the withdrawal process. The Kenyan gov-
ernment did, however, file an admissibility challenge pursuant to Rome Statute Art. 19. See
Application on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya pursuant to Article 19 of the
ICC Statute, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Doc. No. ICC-01/09-01/11-19 (Mar. 31, 2011),
http://www.icc-cpi.inticcdocs/doc/docl050005.pdf. For more on the admissibility challenge, see
Steven Kay QC, The Prosecutor v Kenyatta, Muthaura And Ali ICC, International Criminal Law
Bureau (April 6th, 2011), http://www.internationallawbureau.com/blog/?p=2715. That applica-
tion is unlikely to succeed due to Kenya's refusal to investigate and prosecute those responsible
for the post-election violence.
19. See ICC Weekly Update #60, Iwr'L CRIMINAL COURT, 1 (Dec. 20,2010), http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/785B43BB-A1E9-4AD1-BDEE-1082178F4AA9/282823/Ed6OEng.pdf.
20. Dan Taglioli, Kenya Leaders Appear Before ICC to Deny Charges of Ethnic Killings,
JURIST (Apr. 7, 2011, 1:32 PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/04/kenya-leaders-appear-
before-icc-to-deny-charges-of-ethnic-killings.php.
21. Id.
22. Constitutive Act of the African Union, AFRICAN UNION, 6-7 (July 11, 2000), http://
www.au.intlen/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct-0.pdf.
23. AU Assembly, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council
of the African Union, 8-9 (Jul. 9, 2002, First Ordinary Session in Durban), available at http://
2072012]
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By entrenching these provisions in the AU's primordial legal instru-
ments, the continent became the first region in the world to provide a
specific legal basis for military intervention during conflict to protect
civilians.2 4 In this way, despite obvious resource shortages that pose
serious challenges for the observance of these legal obligations, as the
Darfur situation starkly demonstrates, Africa stands as the first re-
gional body to implement the much-vaunted doctrine of "Responsibil-
ity to Protect." 25 This is a significant step, both for Africa as a
continent and the international community as a whole which needs to
move in the direction of prioritizing human rights of vulnerable peo-
ple everywhere.
We also see a concrete commitment to fight impunity at the level of
individual African countries. Perhaps the best examples of this are the
national processes that led, with the support of the international com-
munity, to the creation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL) 26 , the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)27 .
This is in addition to the increasing practice of African States to prose-
cute serious crimes in various types of national or special military
courts or war crimes units in countries such as Congo, Rwanda and
Uganda.2 8
From the international community's point of view, enhancing ac-
countability for serious international crimes is the core justification for
the permanent Court. In this regard, we may recall the statement of
Canadian Judge Phillipe Kirsch, then the first President of the ICC, in
au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocolpeace and security.pdf. [hereinafter AU Peace and Secur-
ity Protocol].
24. See The Responsibility to Protect, INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVINIION AND STATE SovI-R
IaN]Y, 31 (Dec. 2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.
25. Id. at VII (providing that the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect aims to balance
concerns about state sovereignty with the imperative to act, if need be with force, to halt geno-
cide and crimes against humanity). See also Kristina Powell, The African Union's Emerging
Peace and Security Regime: Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on The Responsibility to
Protect, Timu NoRTI-SounTII INs I., 7-15 (May 2005), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/The%20
African %20Union's%2OEmerging%2OPeace %20and%20Security%20Regime.pdf (explaining
the development of the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect and the use of the doctrine
within the African Union).
26. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Es-
tablishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, 1 (16 Jan.
2002), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=CLkI rMQtCHg%3d&tabid= 176.
27. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecu-
tion of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humani-
tarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for the
Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States Between
I January and 31 December 1994, 5 U.N. Doc. A/51/399 (Sept. 24, 1996).
28. See Press Release, Security Council, Success of Democratic Republic of Congo Peace
Process Depends on Economic Recovery, Reconstruction, Effective Presence of State Inst.;
Head of Mission Says First Stage of Drawdown - 2,000 Troops - Recommended, U.N. Press
Release SC/9905 (Apr. 13, 2010) and United Nations, The Justice and Reconciliation Process in
Rwanda, http://www.un.org/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/backgrounder-jr rwanda.pdf.
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his speech to the AU on June 17, 2006 that "without Africa the ICC
would not exist as it does today; and because of the relationship be-
tween the Court and African States, cooperation with the [AU] is par-
ticularly important to the Court." 29 The Prosecutor, Registrar and
judges of the ICC have all acknowledged the importance of this evolv-
ing relationship.30
III. "[M]ISUSE OF INDICTMENTS AGAINST AFRICAN LEADERS:"
CHANGING TONE OR POLITICAL RHETORIC?
When the Rome Statute entered into force in July 2002, the ICC
was universally acclaimed as an historic milestone, including by Afri-
can states and civil society. Indeed, as Kofi Annan, then UN Secre-
tary-General put it, the Court's establishment was "a gift of hope to
future generations, and a giant step forward in the march towards uni-
versal human rights and the rule of law."31 Annan, a Ghanaian diplo-
mat not known for hyperbole, subsequently proclaimed the ICC the
"missing link in the international justice system."3 2
Unfortunately, just over a decade later, the Court has come under
scathing criticism from various quarters in Africa. Today, some Afri-
can nations, many of which are not even parties to the Rome Statute,
are increasingly questioning what they perceive as an insensitive appli-
cation of the international criminal law instrument to indict only weak
individuals from generally poor African states.3 3 For example, Presi-
dent Paul Kagame of Rwanda has gone so far as to suggest that the
ICC is a "fraudulent institution" reminiscent of "colonialism" and
"imperialism" that is seeking to undermine and to control Africa.34
Although Rwanda is not a member of the ICC, his position is echoed
by others, such as President Thomas Yayi of Benin, who lamented the
"harassment" of African leaders and concluded that "[w]e have the
29. Quoted in A.M. Kambudzi, 'The International Criminal Court and Africa: The AU and
the ICC' in M. Du Plessis and A. Louw (eds.), THE INVI;STIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF
"Cou INTERNATIONAL CRIMES" AND THE ROLE OF THI INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN
AFRICA (Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, 2007) at 29 at 34.
30. See Max du Plessis, The International Criminal Court that Africa Wants, INST. I OR SEc.
STUDIES, 5-6 (Aug. 2010), http://www.iss.co.zaluploads/Monol72.pdf.
31. U.N. Secretary-General, Statement by the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi An-
nan at the Ceremony Held at Campidoglio Celebrating the Adoption of the Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court, 1 11 (Jul. 18, 1998), http://www.un.org/icc/speeches/718sg.htm.
32. Press Release, Transcript of Press Conference with President Carlo Ciampi of Italy and
Secretary-General Kofi Annan in Rome and New York by Video Conference, U.N. Press Re-
lease SG/SM/8194, 3 (Nov. 4, 2002), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sgsm8194.doc.
htm.
33. See David Kezio-Musoke, Kagame Tells Why He is Against ICC Charging Bashir, AFR.
PRESS INT'L, Aug. 5, 2008, http://africanpress.me/2008/08/05/kagame-tells-why-he-is-against-icc-
charging-bashir/. See also infra notes 35-38 and associated text.
34. Id.
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feeling that this court is chasing Africa."3 In other words, while cer-
tainly exaggerated and largely unsupported by the facts, the growing
perception is that Africans have become the sacrificial lambs in the
ICC's struggle for global legitimation.
Professor Mahmood Mamdani, a Ugandan scholar at Columbia
University, has eloquently captured this sentiment. He argued in a
recent article that the "ICC is rapidly turning into a Western court to
try African crimes against humanity."36 To him, "the realization that
the ICC has tended to focus only on African crimes, and mainly on
crimes committed by adversaries of the United States, has introduced
a note of sobriety into the African discussion" and fuelled concerns
about a "politicized justice" and even bigger questions about the "re-
lationship between law and politics.""
Without suggesting that the ICC is above constructive criticism, I
have elsewhere contested Professor Mamdani's exaggerated assess-
ment. In particular, he advances a position that fails to reflect the nu-
ances of the role that African states have played in seeking the
involvement of the Court in their crises. I have also rejected the impli-
cations of his argument that the ICC should be rebranded the Interna-
tional Criminal Court for Africa or the African International Criminal
Court. Be that as it may, Africa's dream for a strong, independent
and effective tribunal that would assist it to secure enduring peace
through the application of international justice to various conflict or
post-conflict situations appears, at best, to be facing major challenges.
At worst, the dream seems to be turning into a nightmare as some AU
leaders agonize over the "misuse of indictments against African
leaders.""
For analytical purposes, the concerns raised by AU states tend to
come in two shades. First, what I call legal challenges; and second,
political challenges. As a lawyer, let me first mention the legal chal-
lenges before saying a word or two about the political matters:
1. The issue of state consent and ICC jurisdiction over nationals of
non-parties; especially Sudan 3 and Chapter VII, which goes be-
35. Benin President Expresses Scepticism [sic] Over ICC, SU1AN TIim., Sept. 28, 2008, http:/
/www.sudantribune.com/Benin-president-expresses,28762.
36. Mahmood Mamdani, How the ICC's "Responsibility to Protect" is Being Turned Into An
Assertion of Neocolonial Domination, PAMBAZUKA NFWS (Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.
pambazuka.org/en/category/features/50568.
37. Id.
38. AU's Peace and Security Council Resolution on Sudan President Indictment, SUDAN
TRIm., Jul. 21. 2008, http://www.sudantribune.com/AU-s-Peace-and-Security-Council,27982.
39. Although the OTP recently announced its investigation into crimes allegedly committed
in Libya during the non international armed conflict currently taking place there, this discussion
will focus on Sudan, in which a sitting head of state has actually been issued an arrest warrant. It
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yond ICC to concerns about the role of the Security Council in
international peace and security.
2. ICC jurisdiction over a sitting head of state, in particular Bashir,
and the intersection of and lack of clarity between Articles 27
(which removes immunities for government officials) and 98 of
the Rome Statute (which bars the Court from requesting a state
to act in a manner that contravenes its customary international
law obligation owed to other states).
3. The selection of indictees and the hiccups of the Lubanga trial.
This concern seems to come up among those who think that
higher profile persons, from all sides in the concerned conflicts,
needs to be prosecuted in The Hague.
4. There is also the question of whose justice will apply; distant tri-
als tend to enhance the perception of "white man's" (in)justice.
Regarding the political challenges, there are three primary ones:
1. The argument that ICC-style justice crowds out possibilities for
reconciliation, such as the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda,
and adding Sudan's Darfur region to the list.
2. The perceived "double-standard" and U.S. exceptionalism, espe-
cially in the face of UN Security Council intervention in the in-
ner workings of the Court through the ability to refer and defer
cases pursuant to Articles 13 and 16 of the Rome Statute.
3. The depredations and scars of colonialism, which frankly, have
remain unaddressed in international relations between former
European and African states.
I mention but will not cover all these issues in the limited time we
have for this lecture. In addition, there have been various additional
criticisms of the Court in each of the situations under its current scru-
tiny. However, Sudan has been the most challenging for the ICC. Let
me therefore take the Sudan situation as a case study to illustrate the
is, however, entirely possible that Gaddafi will be charged in the future as well. The rapidly
evolving situation in Libya will not be a focus of this particular discussion and was not, to remind
the reader, at issue at the time these remarks were initially delivered. See Decision to Terminate
the Case Against Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, (Nov.
22, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl274559.pdf (terminating prosecution due to his
death).
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challenges of achieving justice in Africa in this climate of hostility and
suspicion of the motives behind international justice.
Case Study: the ICC, Bashir Warrant and the Challenges of the
Sudan Situation
Since the Security Council referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan
to the ICC in March 2005,40 the Prosecutor has successfully issued va-
rious arrest warrants arising from his investigations. 4 ' However, but
for one recent voluntary appearance, there seems to be little, or no,
prospect for their execution - at least at this stage until African states
choose to help enforce the indictments.
The latest and most significant warrant was that for incumbent Su-
danese President Omar Hassan Al Bashir.4 2 The Bashir warrant has
proven to be highly controversial within legal and political circles, in
Africa and elsewhere.4 3 Among the more contentious issues, lawyers
have debated the accuracy of the Prosecutor's characterization of his
alleged criminal conduct in Darfur as genocide and whether or not the
Sudanese leader's immunities would evaporate once the arrest war-
rant is issued.' Others have debated whether an indictment unlikely
to be executed in the short-term is a pragmatic prosecutorial strategy
40. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
41. See, e.g., Warrant for Arrest for Ahmad Harun, INT'L CRIMINAL COURr, (Apr. 27, 2007),
http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279813.PDF.
42. See Press Release, ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ICC Issues a Warrant of Arrest of
Omar Al Bashir, President of Sudan (Mar. 3, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/Go?id=16072f
d9-0b88-4cdb-87b4-a24de2fld7cf&lan=en-GB; Situation in Darfur, the Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/
05-157, Public Redacted Version of the Prosecutor's Application under Article 58 (Jul. 14, 2008),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc559998.pdf; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-/
01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest (Mar. 4, 2009), http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639096.pdf; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, No. ICC-02/05-01/09-1, War-
rant of Arrest (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf.
43. See infra note 50 and associated text, and Part 5.
44. See Rep. of the Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur to the U.N. Secretary-General at 4
(Jan. 25, 2005) (concluding that the crimes in Darfur did not reveal the specific intent to commit
genocide). This immediately spawned a debate. After the Prosecutor's public application for an
arrest warrant, commentators questioned whether Bashir's alleged crimes amounted to geno-
cide. See, e.g., Andrew T. Cayley, The Prosecutor's Strategy in Seeking the Arrest of Sudanese
President Al Bashiron Charges of Genocide, 6 J. INT'l CRIM. JusTr. 829 (2008) and Alex de Waal,
Darfur, the Court and Khartoum: The Politics of State Non-Cooperation, in Courting Conflict?
Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa (Nicholas Waddell and Phil Clark eds., 2008). In its decision
approving the arrest warrant, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber found that the information supplied by
the ICC Prosecutor did not show reasonable grounds to believe that the Sudanese government
acted with specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups.
Charges for genocide were therefore not included for the arrest warrant. Nonetheless, the
Chamber left a window open for an amendment or modification in light of any new information
submitted subsequently under Rome Statute Art. 58(6). See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Decision on
the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest, $T 206-208.
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in the long-term, as well as the propriety of a Security Council deferral
- as requested by AU leaders.4 5
Even more significant to the future of the ICC as a nascent institu-
tion was the political reaction within regional organizations. In partic-
ular, following the Prosecutor's application for an arrest warrant for
President Bashir in July 2008, the AU Peace and Security Council, the
primary decision-making organ for conflict resolution in Africa, im-
mediately adopted a decision calling on the UN Security Council to
deploy Article 16 of the Rome Statute to "defer the process initiated
by the ICC."4 6
In a number of strongly worded decisions, the AU observed that
while it endorses criminal accountability for gross human rights viola-
tions, given the "delicate nature" of the processes currently underway
in the Sudan, the search for justice should be pursued in a way that
complements, rather than impedes, efforts to secure a lasting peace in
the country. It emphasized that ICC jurisdiction is based on comple-
mentarity and that a prosecution in the current climate "may not be in
the interest of the victims and justice" because it could lead to greater
destabilization in Sudan and the region.4 7
Richard Goldstone, the first Prosecutor for the ICTY/ICTR, has ar-
gued that there is in fact no peace process to.speak of in Darfur.4 8 I
think that is an exaggeration, as can be seen by the various successful
attempts to address the conflict at a political level through, for exam-
ple, the Abuja Peace Process. In any event, whatever our individual
views, the AU apparently sees the ICC as being on a collision course
with its own peacemaking efforts. Tanzanian President Jakaya M.
Kikwete, speaking for African leaders in 2008, publicly clarified that
45. Christopher Gosnell, The Request for an Arrest Warrant in Al Bashir: Idealistic Postur-
ing or Calculated Plan?, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 841 (2008) and Annalisa Ciampi, The Proceedings
Against President Al Bashir and the Prospects of their Suspension Under Article 16 ICC Statute, 6
J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 885 (2008).
46. AU Peace and Security Council, Communiqud of the 142nd Meeting of the Peace and
Security Council, $$ 3, 5, 9, 11(i), PSC/MIN/Comm. (CXLII) (July 21, 2008); AU Assembly,
Decision on the Application by the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor for the In-
dictment of the President of the Republic of the Sudan, $T 2, 3, Assembly/AU/Dec.221 (XII)
(Feb 3, 2009); AU Peace and Security Council, Communiqu6 of the 175th Meeting of the Peace
and Security Council,, $T 4-6, PSC/PR/Comm. (CLXXV)(Mar. 5, 2009). See also Communiqud,
African Union, The Chairperson of the Commission Expresses Deep Concern at the Decision of
the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I on Sudan and its Impact on the Ongoing Peace Processes in Sudan
(Mar. 4, 2009).
47. The AU has been seeking a peaceful resolution to the Darfur crisis and, as part of this,
deployed the first hybrid peacekeeping force between the UN and a regional organization to
Sudan in July 2007 pursuant to S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007).
48. See Richard Goldstone, Editorial, Catching A War Criminal in the Act, N.Y. TIMES, Jul.
15, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/opinion/15goldstone.html and Louise Arbour, Edi-
torial, Justice v. Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/16/opinion/
16iht-edarbour.1.16197765.html.
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"[j]ustice has to be done. Justice must be seen to be done. What the
AU is simply saying is that what is critical, what is the priority, is
peace." 49 Unfortunately, partly due to the bad human rights record
enjoyed by some African leaders, some question the good faith of AU
leaders when they make these statements.
The AU has also secured the support of other regional bodies, in-
cluding the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Con-
ference and the Non Aligned Movement, ostensibly to rein in the
ICC. Likely because of Sudanese backroom lobbying, all those orga-
nizations had for their own reasons already, or have since, publicly
joined the AU chorus singing down the wisdom of indicting President
Bashir at this time.50
The situation only got worse when, in 2009, the now besieged Lib-
yan Leader Muammar Gaddafi was named chairperson of the AU. It
was during his time in that position that AU States adopted, in Sirte in
July 2009, the controversial decision suspending cooperation with the
ICC in respect of the arrest and surrender of the Sudanese leader.
Basically, all AU Member States were instructed not to enforce the
warrant. This has raised concerns whether some African states are
being put in a situation where they might have conflicting obligations
between two different organizations: on the one part, the ICC which
seeks that they enforce the Bashir warrant, and on the other, the AU
which says that they should not enforce it. I will revisit this important
issue briefly in the concluding part of my remarks, as it will be a ques-
tion that will have to resolved in other situations that might arise for
the future. One would probably as part of this see the ICC taking a
formal position on this issue. The matter might also give rise to litiga-
tion in African courts, where civil society groups might launch judicial
challenges seeking to compel the arrest of the respective fugitive
should they set foot on the territory of, say, South Africa.
Clearly, as I suggested earlier, the ICC is a new and important insti-
tution in the global quest for justice. That said, since the Rome Stat-
ute entered into force in 2002, the practice of the ICC has shown that
the challenges of giving justice at the international level are many,
49. Andrew Heavens, A U Chairman Backs Sudan's Bashir Over Court, Reuters, Sept. 8,
2008, http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid= USL8101824.
50. See, e.g., OIC Secretary General Strongly Rejects the ICC Indictment Against Sudan's
President, Newsletter (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation), Mar. 4, 2009, http://www.oic-oci.
org/newsletter-print.asp?n-id=150 (expressing his disappointment over the Bashir indictment;
warning that it could lead to "dangerous ramifications"; rejecting the "kind of selectivity and
double standards applied by the international community" in addressing international crimes
and appealing to the Security Council to "suspend the move by the ICC in the interest of the
ongoing peace efforts in the Sudan"); Arab Leaders Back "Wanted" Bashir, BBC News (Mar.
30, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7971624.stm (reporting on Arab League's expressed support
of Al Bashir at its annual summit).
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real, and political. The Court is perhaps overloaded by hyper expecta-
tions of what it can realistically achieve. Yet, it has not been insulated
from the harsh political realities of the Westphalian state-centric
world in which it must function. The legal texts in the Rome Statute
reflected a compromise, in fact, and in many cases, those were uneasy
compromises where law was held hostage to the national interests of
powerful states. States essentially set up the ICC judges for challenges
that could have been avoided, if sovereignty was given a backseat to
justice instead of the other way around. From the AU perspective, the
results are less than satisfactory because we now have a court that is
perceived as not only imperial, but also as lacking clarity in its statute,
and sometimes, as downright obstructionist.
The question, then, is as follows: should we worry about the current
perception of the ICC in Africa? I say yes, for at least three primary
reasons. The first is quite practical: essentially, this is where the
Court's work is coming from and, in my mind, where it will likely
come from for a while due to a combination of factors, including the
nature and number of African conflicts and lack of legal systems will-
ing and capable to prosecute international crimes. In other words, I
would say, in the spirit of businesses everywhere in the world, that the
ICC should not alienate its primary customer. Otherwise, it can't
hope to get repeat business - here, in the form of future self-referrals
to the court. This is, after all, the best kind of business - the kind that
you do not have to work or advertise for, and that you get thanks to
the good service you are known to provide. In this case, the service is
to the African states and the victims whose desire to seek justice is
what the ICC tries to fulfill.
Second, the reality is that as powerful as it may sound, the ICC does
not have a police force or standing ICC army or UN blue berets that it
could call on to enforce its decisions. It is rather like a giant without
arms. I am referring, of course, to the regime of state cooperation as a
sine qua non to the execution of the mandate of these kinds of inter-
national institutions. If state cooperation is lacking, then we are all in
trouble as the mandate would be difficult if not impossible to achieve.
This is not an exaggeration, as a look at the experiences of the ad hoc
criminal tribunals will confirm for us. We will also be unlikely to
achieve our noble goal: that is, to provide justice for victims of crimes
in Africa when their countries are inactive and/or unwilling or unable
to act.
Last, but not least, we should worry about the perceptions of the
Court in Africa because we are purporting to give justice for victims
of crimes that shock all of humanity. At the end of the day, however,
we know that some victims are closer to the crimes than the rest of us.
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These are the direct victims of the atrocities who bear, more than all
of us, the brunt of conflicts and mayhem that dog their societies. This,
to my mind, gives them greater claim over what must be done in a
given situation. Although, needless to say, in some instances the inter-
national community comes in to play a constructive above the bar role
when we help break old patterns of mistrust and animosity by simply
making the decision as to what should be done to resolve a longstand-
ing feud. Those communities might need that help sometimes, and the
fresh perspective offered by outsiders. We also want to talk to the
perpetrators in atrocity situations, by hopefully deterring them both
generally and specifically from committing further crimes.
In other words, at the level of both principle and of deterrence, we
have a duty to not only act on behalf of but also to listen to Africans.
But not just their conservative feet dragging governments, also their
civil societies which are generally more progressive in order to ascer-
tain their views on how we can help. The outcomes of criminal
processes that do not take those views into consideration cannot be
called credible justice. Nor is it justice when we substitute our own
conceptions of justice for their own, or if we determine their priorities
for them, rather than consult with them to determine how to move
forward. After all, the decisions we, "the international community,"
make affect Africans themselves more directly than anyone else.
I will now turn to the final and central element of my argument,
which is that, despite the currently rocky relationship, which I believe
will evolve over time, both Africa and the ICC have much to gain
from each other. This is the win-win that I mentioned earlier.
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND THE
LOGIC OF MUTUAL GAIN AND MUTUAL VULNERABILITY
My argument here entails two distinct but mutually reinforcing as-
pects embedded in the Rome Statute and the AU's Constitutive Act,
as well as the AU Peace and Security Protocol. In the first place,
these instruments conceive of the prevention of international crimes as
a fundamental objective. This is evident from even a cursory reading
of their respective preambles. This is a laudable but highly ambitious
goal, since for as long as we have conflict, we will regrettably have
international crimes. Conflicts have not been wiped off the face of the
earth, nor therefore, will international crimes - at least until we can
achieve Kant's perpetual peace.
Second, where the Court's and Africa's efforts fail to prevent crimi-
nal activity and international offences are in fact committed, the sub-
stantive provisions of both the Rome Statute and the AU's
Constitutive Act provide for the punishment of the key perpetrators
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of such crimes. In other words, under both, accountability is an imper-
ative; impunity not an option.
The two (AU and ICC) regimes are therefore conjoined by the
shared belief that prosecution of international offences would not only
help prevent crimes, as ambitious as that objective maybe, but that it
will also likely deter others from committing such offences in the fu-
ture. Against this backdrop, it seems rather obvious that collabora-
tion would offer Africa and the ICC mutual gain and that there would
be lost opportunities and a "mutual vulnerability" should they fail to
do so.
Let us examine this, first, from the perspective of the Court and,
then, from the perspective of Africa.
A. The "Win-Win" for the International Criminal Court
In my view, collaboration between the ICC and African countries to
battle impunity would help a new court struggling to find its feet and
place in the world, and on the other hand, is a blessing for a continent
in search of a sustainable peace after centuries of violence and tur-
moil.s" With its current six investigations in Africa, the Court will gain
significant benefits if it successfully prosecutes its maiden cases in fair
trials meeting the highest standards of international justice. In this
way it would prove itself as a functional and effective court of law.
The importance of this to the ICC cannot be overemphasized. This
is particularly so considering that, as one commentator noted back in
2008, it spent over $600 million dollars in just over six years in opera-
tion, and had at that time only four accused in its custody while eight
of its twelve arrest warrants remained outstanding. After legendary
difficulties over disclosure, its first case, the Lubanga trial finally got
underway in early 2009." In this context, the Court is now at a crucial
developmental stage: it must achieve completion of its seminal first
case, and through that, demonstrate it can achieve tangible judicial
results. The benefits of such success for its work and reputation would
be immense.
First, fair and independent trials will boost state confidence in the
ICC as a new institution and would even, perhaps, generate more re-
ferrals and ratifications from other countries in Africa and elsewhere.
Crucially, if it shows independence and effectiveness, the Court will
likely reassure the skeptical but powerful holdout states, such as the
51. See, e.g., Charles Chernor Jalloh, Regionalizing Criminal Law?, 9 INT'L CRIM. L. REV.
445 (2009).
52. Ciampi, supra note 45, at 892.
53. Heikelina Verrijn Stuart, The ICC in Trouble, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 409 (2008) (discuss-
ing the stay of proceedings in the Lubanga case and the disclosure debacle).
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U.S., China and India, who between themselves constitute well over
half of the world's population, that it can discharge its mandate effec-
tively and thereby merits their formal support through party status. 4
Second, as various recitals of the Rome Statute preamble confirm,
the ICC was intended to address atrocities that "deeply shock the con-
science of humanity" based on the recognition "that such grave crimes
threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world."" Indeed
states resolved that the "most serious crimes of concern to the interna-
tional community as a whole" must not go unpunished.5 6 They also
affirmed that responsibility for prosecuting such crimes requires that
measures be taken at the national level.
Thus, crucially and unlike the ad hoc Yugoslav and Rwanda tribu-
nals, the Court only possesses secondary jurisdiction vis-A-vis the pri-
mary jurisdiction of states. This is entrenched through the Article 17
complementarity principle." The underlying logic of that principle is
that the permanent court must supplement, not supplant, the work of
national jurisdictions; hence, it can only exercise jurisdiction when
states prove to be inactive and/or unwilling or unable to prosecute. In
this way, complementarity enables the ICC to give effect to states'
collective determination "to put an end to impunity" for the perpetra-
tors of international crimes and "thus to contribute to the prevention of
such crimes."5
As Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo observed, the consequence of com-
plementarity means that a high number of cases before the Court
would not measure its efficiency.6 0 On the contrary, the absence of
trials before the Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of
national institutions, would be a major success. This is the so-called
positive complementarity, which so far, has been all the talk but with
which there has been very limited action.
From the Court's perspective, it has a significant advantage when
African countries conduct fair and effective national prosecutions.
That will allow it to in turn focus on the high ranking accused deemed
to be "most responsible" or "bearing greatest responsibility" for inter-
national crimes in other parts of the world. Under this model, the
ICC and African states could carve a division of labor whereby the
54. See David Scheffer et al., The End of Exceptionalism in War Crimes: The International
Criminal Court and America's Credibility in the World, HARVARD INr'i Ri v. (Nov. 21, 2007),
http://hir.harvard.edu/the-end-of-exceptionalism-in-war-crimes.
55. Rome Statute Preamble.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Rome Statute art. 17(1)(a).
59. Rome Statute Preamble (emphasis added).
60. ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the
Prosecutor at 4 (Sept. 2003).
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affected countries undertake prosecution of lower and middle ranking
suspects while leaving ranking perpetrators, the ostensible "big fish,"
to international investigation and prosecution.
This is the mandate and also stated goal of the Prosecutor who has
affirmed that he will only pursue those holding leadership positions,
but nevertheless warned about an "impunity gap" if national authori-
ties fail to deploy other means to bring lower tier suspects to justice.6'
Third, it will obviously be less costly for the Court if African coun-
tries can prosecute their own alleged genocidaires and war criminals.
This is particularly important given the substantial funds required to
hold trials thousands of miles away from the crime base in a faraway
European city (The Hague). This issue is more important than might
first appear, even for the relatively well-endowed ICC. In this regard,
the experience of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which had a
more volatile funding structure, suffices to illustrate the kinds of chal-
lenges awaiting the ICC when it is fully engaged. One needs merely
to recall the impact on the SCSL of the controversial decision to
change the venue of the trial of former Liberian President Charles
Taylor from the seat of that tribunal in Freetown to The Hague.62
Perhaps more importantly, besides saving funds that could then be
diverted to compensate victims of international crimes under the
unique ICC Trust Fund for Victims, in situ prosecutions will give Afri-
cans a better chance to witness their tormentors being brought to jus-
tice. Based on the lessons from the first generation UN tribunals, this
is now widely acknowledged to be an important goal for international
criminal justice.
From an ICC perspective, this may help resolve growing complaints
about the extent of national participation in its processes because of a
geographic divorce between, on the one hand, the accused, the crime
and victim base and, on the other, the formal seat of the court and
trials in The Hague.
Finally, encouraging national prosecution would be a pragmatic de-
cision by the Court, one that would enhance efficiency given its inabil-
ity to address every meritorious situation. As any reasonable lawyer
who has worked in the tribunals can tell you, it is immediately appar-
ent that capable states, rather than international institutions, are the
best placed to address international crimes from a criminal process
point of view. The witnesses, the evidence, the crime scene are all bet-
ter and more efficiently accessible to national authorities. The interna-
61. Id. at 3.
62. See generally Charles Chernor Jalloh, Special Court for Sierra Leone Dismisses Taylor
Motion for Change of Venue, (June 15, 2006) http://www.asil.org/insights060615.cfm (discussing
the denial of Taylor's motion for change of venue).
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tional option is there, and must be available, but only as a backup
option.
B. The "Win- Win" for Africa
With a strong, impartial and effective ICC, Africa is likely to be an
even bigger beneficiary of a solid relationship with it.
First, at the regional level, African governments can better achieve
the broader good governance and rule of law objectives outlined in
the AU's constitutive instruments, especially the ambitious and proac-
tive conflict prevention and management system anticipated by the
Peace and Security Protocol.6 3 This will enhance the ability of the
region to continue blazing the trail in implementing the responsibility
to protect. Again that doctrine, of so-called humanitarian interven-
tion, will achieve greater traction in the future. And, Africa, will be
contributing to the world community by road testing how the principle
can be applied in practice, where the rubber hits the road.
Second, the Court can assist African governments to build capacity
in the prosecution of serious international crimes within their domes-
tic tribunals. In fact, the Prosecutor has indicated that he will enter
into cooperation arrangements with national counterparts to assist in
capacity-building, and to ensure local prosecutions of international
crimes based on the idea of positive complementarity.64 It is hard to
assess whether this effort has been prioritized in practice. It is also
difficult to see where the ICC will get the resources to carry out these
activities which, in many ways, fall outside the edges of its core man-
date to prosecute crimes. Still, to the extent that this policy is bol-
stered by action, say with the support of developed countries through
bilateral and multilateral assistance, spin-off effects could be the
strengthening of domestic criminal legislation in African countries
and, perhaps, the enhancement of national justice systems' ability to
deliver more credible justice. This is the long term effect that can help
the Court make a meaningful and sustainable impact in the societies
where international crimes are committed.
Third, and perhaps more fundamentally from a concerned African
government perspective, an enhanced capacity to claim their first right
to prosecute the international crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court may be the best weapon in their arsenal to counter any at-
tempts to encroach on their state sovereignty. In my view, to counter
63. AU Assembly, A U Peace and Security Protocol, 1 (Jul. 9, 2002, First Ordinary Session in
Durban), available at http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol-peace and security.pdf.
64. ICC Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court Paper on some policy issues
before the Office of the Prosecutor, 5 (Sept. 2003), http://www.amicc.org/docs/OcampoPolicyPa-
per9_03.pdf.
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the Prosecutor's alleged overemphasis on situations in the continent,
African leaders are better off looking to the future to start building
the necessary criminal justice systems that would enable them to fulfill
their treaty obligations under the Rome Statute. They could also
come together at sub-regional and regional levels to put in place the
credible justice institutions to prosecute international crimes on the
continent. This could lead to the creation of regional or even sub-
regional circuit courts where African states and regional organizations
can refer cases. Imagine, for example, what will happen if the Special
Court for Sierra Leone facilities were used to try crimes in the West
Africa sub-region. Similarly, imagine the tremendous benefits that will
be gained if we used the Rwanda Tribunal facilities in Arusha,
Tanzania to prosecute international crimes in East and Central Africa.
In many ways, the AU and the ICC's objective of encouraging action
at the national level to mete out accountability would be better
achieved through such concrete steps than making dramatic and un-
supported allegations in the media. These tend to make good press;
not good policy. At least the type of good policy that is in Africa's best
interest.
Fourth, from the perspective of conflict-torn African countries, the
benefits of a strong and effective ICC may extend well beyond trials
of those most responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes. They now include the ICC's long-awaited jurisdiction ra-
tione materiae over the substantive crime of aggression, defined after
years of negotiations as "the planning, preparation, initiation or exe-
cution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or
to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggres-
sion which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest
violation of the Charter of the United Nations."6 5 This could offer a
significant benefit in the fight against the scourge of conflict - a matter
that we have already seen is of grave concern to Africa.66
The context is that in conflicts on the continent nowadays, aggres-
sors appear to come from other African states, acting directly or
through proxy rebel groups, instead of others further afield, as was the
case historically. A good example of this is the ongoing conflicts in
the Great Lakes region in which a number of states in the East and
65. United Nations, AMENDMENTS TO THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 6 (June 11, 2010), http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/
2010/CN.651.2010-Eng.pdf.
66. See generally Beth Van Schaack, Negotiating at the Interface of Power and Law: The
Crime of Aggression, 49 CoLum. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 505 (2011) (discussing the politics and evolu-
tion of the elements and definition of the crime of aggression) and Claus Kress, Leonie Von
Holtzendorff, The Kampala Compromise on the Crime ofAggression, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1179
(2010) (discussing the Kampala compromise and the consensus decision).
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Central Africa sub-regions have been implicated.6 7 A similar situa-
tion arose in West Africa in relation to the wars in the Mano River
Union region: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea; in the Horn of Af-
rica, and also in southern Africa.68
These examples suggest that the continent should attach high value
to the idea of subjecting the crime of aggression to prosecution. If this
contention is correct, the biggest benefit conferred by the Rome Stat-
ute on Africa - particularly considering the number of ongoing con-
flicts on the continent - has only recently arrived. This development
does not merely offer advantages to Africa, however. It also benefits
the international community as well, whose ultimate aim to save suc-
ceeding generations of humanity from the scourge of war was so sig-
nificant that it was imbibed as the first preambular item in the UN
Charter. 9
In my view, all these factors make this the wrong time for African
states to withdraw their mostly enthusiastic support for the ICC.
Luckily, the drafters of the Rome Statute left room for dissent via
Articles 18 and 19, which pertain to admissibility, so that states wish-
ing to channel their concerns with current prosecutorial practice may
do so by filing legal briefs before the judges of the Court in specific
cases, as Kenya has recently done.70 Alternately, and perhaps more
appropriately, they are free to pursue their concerns within the more
political framework of the Assembly of States Parties. These are all
legitimate channels that African states can invoke while continuing to
play within the emerging system of international criminal justice
anchored by the Court.
Finally, in my view, Africa can and should use the Court to continue
spotlighting its anti-impunity initiatives and its responsibility to pro-
tect agenda, an agenda placed into even starker relief given the rap-
idly evolving situation in Libya, of which both the Security Council
and the ICC are now actively seized. This is especially important
given the fleeting attention span of a Security Council seemingly over-
whelmed with global hot spots in a less peaceful than expected post-
Cold War world. With an engaged ICC, the continent could more eas-
67. See generally Sarah M. H. Nouwen & Wouter G. Werner, Doing Justice to the Political:
The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 941, 958 (2010)
(discussing the role of states and their impact on the International Criminal Court).
68. Peace and Security: How can the EU Support Regional Approaches, (May 2010) http://
www.ecdpm.org/WebECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/2E3602BC89335DD7C125786A0
030A931/$FILE/West%2OAfrica%2OSeminar%20-%20ECDPM%2OBackground%20note%20-
%20Peace%20and%20Security%20FINAL.pdf.
69. U.N. Charter Preamble.
70. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 18 and 19 (Feb. 26, 2012) http://
www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADDI 6852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/Rome
StatutEng1.pdf.
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ily generate the necessary international interest and assistance in
resolving its human security problems.
As the tragic example of Rwanda's genocide showed in 1994, Africa
cannot take for granted that security concerns within its own backyard
are necessarily a top priority for the UN and the international commu-
nity - even when those matters fall squarely within the contours of the
Security Council responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security contained in Article 39 of the UN Charter.
Given the larger global context, African leaders, who would com-
plain at once if the international community did not pay attention to
crises exercising the continent, will risk losing credibility if, now that
they have its attention at the level of the Court and, for that matter
the UN, they protest about too much interest in the myriad challenges
confronting the continent. What will they do, in another decade,
when the ICC turns its attention to other regions of the world? Will
they then come back and complain that Africa is being ignored? Such
a complaint will be met with hostility and will perhaps be ignored. The
result will be that it would be too late for African victims to rely on
the Court for justice which their governments at home are sometimes
unable or unwilling to render. This, of course, is not to suggest that
AU states do not have any valid concerns about the impact of current
ICC activities in Darfur and elsewhere on the continent in which they
remain heavily invested. It is only to say that they can and should
proceed more carefully while seeking to achieve their objectives, like
any other region of the world.
V. CONCLUSION
The Africa-ICC relationship currently appears to be confronted
with some major challenges. However, because of the dynamism of
international relations, that relationship will continue to evolve. In
this regard, a number of tentative observations may be offered keep-
ing in mind that the relationship is still in its infancy.
To start with, it seems clear that the embattled continent has some
strong and legitimate concerns about how international prosecutions
may fit into its broader peacemaking and peace-building objectives.
In relation to the Sudan situation which has ignited substantial contro-
versy, the AU has reiterated that it is not opposed to prosecutions, but
that it is concerned about the timing of prosecutions. In this unprece-
dented area, some measure of controversy is perhaps to be expected
and inevitable.
71. U.N. Charter art. 39, par. 1.
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Still, Africa's apprehension about the timing of prosecutions vis-A-
vis its peacemaking attempts should not be discarded lightly by the
ICC Prosecutor, other organs of the Court, or the rest of the interna-
tional community. The reason is that its effect on further loss of life
and human rights violations may extend well beyond the realm of the
legal to the humanitarian, political and economic. And, as the af-
fected region, there is nothing to say that Africa should not have a
greater say in determining its own affairs. However, any such determi-
nations must be made in a context where African states accept respon-
sibility for ensuring that justice will be rendered in the specific
situations where justice might otherwise be sacrificed to promote the
interests of those in power. That, too, is untenable and unacceptable
as the victims of crimes in Africa deserve that some justice is meted
out to those who committed crimes against them.
In any case, given that the ICC appears to be stretched thinner than
ever, some delay arising from the Sudan situation may not be a bad
thing after all as it could, among other things, permit it to "regroup"
and to muster further support from states, in Africa and elsewhere,
and to (re)focus its energies and resources.
In the long term, it should be recalled that African governments
have urged the Sudanese authorities to take concrete steps to improve
human rights conditions on the ground, all the while pressing for a
comprehensive peace agreement between the warring sides.7 2 They
have gone even further to deploy thousands of peacekeepers in the
country, thereby showing that they are willing to put their money
where their mouths are. These are important steps that we must
recognize, and provided African states act in a manner consistent with
the obligations that they have undertaken under the Rome Statute,
they should be encouraged. They are all important considerations that
must be weighed by the ICC and the international community, though
the full implications of the Bashir arrest warrant remain unclear at this
stage.
From the perspective of the Court, it is clear that it has a mandate
to prosecute, as a court of last resort, international crimes committed
within national jurisdictions that are unwilling or incapable to do so.
To some extent and understandably, its work has so far focused on this
aspect. Nevertheless, the Prosecutor must now start attending to the
much harder task of engaging the prevention of further commission of
72. See generally Itai Madamombe, Darfur crises challenges Africa: A Complex Conflict
Brings Mixed Responses (Jan. 2005), http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/voll8no4/184su-
dan.htm (discussing the responses of the different African states to the Darfur conflict).
73. Id.
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international crimes, a core rationale of prosecutions - as reflected in
the preamble of the Rome Statute.7 4
The prevention mandate is particularly important for the future suc-
cess of the nascent Court as an international institution since, as
Moreno-Ocampo himself acknowledged, the number of cases prose-
cuted should not ultimately be the benchmark for gauging its suc-
cess.7s In this regard, it is probably time for his office to shore up its
programs to build national capacity to confront impunity, in line with
the complementarity principle. It is also probably time for countries
around the world that are able to do so to step up and assist the Court
in this noble mission.
When added to a serious outreach program in Africa, this will help
to address the misinformation and distortions about the work of the
ICC in a continent with low levels of literacy. Engaging directly and
aggressively with African civil society will also help the Court to build
bridges with the local populations. This has not yet happened at the
level that it ought to. Yet, it would make the ICC's achievement of its
legitimacy and justice goals on the continent more likely.
At a more basic level, since my argument is about mutual gain and
mutual vulnerability for both Africa and the ICC, the relationship be-
tween the Prosecutor and his African partners in the fight against im-
punity should not be allowed to stray, or worse, become antagonistic -
as appears to be the case currently. The danger is that there may have
already been a chilling effect to the Bashir warrant because the AU
requested that all 30 African States Parties to the Rome Statute con-
vene at its headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in June 2009.76
That is where the AU encouraged African states to "exchange views
on the work of the ICC in relation to Africa, in particular in the light
of the process initiated against African personalities, and to submit
recommendations thereon taking into account all relevant ele-
ments."7 7 Even more worrying, in the period leading up to it, was
anecdotal evidence suggesting that some African countries were con-
templating a mass walkout from the Rome Statute altogether.
Fortunately, it appears that a number of factors converged to help
avert the threatened withdrawals. Among these was that some Afri-
74. Rome Statute, Preamble at [5.
75. ICC Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 60, at 4.
76. CICC Secretariat, Press Release from Coalition for the International Criminal Court,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=newsdetail&news=3390 (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
77. AU Assembly, Decision on the Application by the International Criminal Court (ICC)
Prosecutor for the Indictment of the President of the Republic of the Sudan, [ 5, Assembly/AU/
Dec.221 (XII) (Feb 3, 2009 Twelfth Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia).
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can States warned against such withdrawals." NGOs and civil society
also organized around the issue, calling on African States to recommit
themselves to the Rome Statute." They also emphasized that it is in
Africa's best interest to continue participating in the work of the
Court. Ultimately, African leaders appeared to have gotten the mes-
sage that there is little for them to gain by withdrawing from the
Rome treaty. That is certainly correct.
Subsequently, at the Assembly of Heads of State summit in Sirte,
Libya in early July 2009, African leaders, most of whom were dissatis-
fied that progress had not been achieved on their request for the Se-
curity Council to defer to the Sudan investigations by the ICC,
decided that all AU Member States should refuse to cooperate with
the Court by not enforcing the Bashir arrest warrant.80 This was sur-
prising as it was not limited to just the 31 African States Parties to the
Rome Statute. The decision, which has been very controversial, has
been criticized by many in the human rights community." Since then,
the AU decision has been reiterated by various additional decisions
adopted by the African leadership, including as recently as Kampala
on July 25, 2010.82
Whether or not the decision sits well, if at all, with states' obliga-
tions under the Rome Statute is far from clear, especially Part 9 of the
statute, which places an obligation on states to assist the court in
whatever way it requests.8 This is a duty that they owe to the Court
in order to help make its work effective. It is a duty that African states
must take seriously, and where there is a doubt, they should err on the
78. See generally Eunice Rugene, Kenya lawmakers vote to pullout of International Criminal
Court, http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/World/-/688340/1078072/-/10hdnbv/-/index.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 28, 2012).
79. See e.g., Ismail Musa Ladu, Uganda: NGOs Lobby for States Commitment Ahead of ICC
Meet, THI MONITOR (May 21, 2010), http://allafrica.com/stories/201005270736.html.
80. See AU Assembly, Decision of the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Assembly/AU/Dec.245 (XIII), at 2, 110, Doc. Assem-
bly/AU/13 (XIII) (July 3, 2009 13th Ordinary Session of the Assembly in Sirte) (requesting AU
Member States not to cooperate with the ICC arrest warrant for Bashir); see also Prosecutor v.
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Prosecution's Ap-
plication for a Warrant of Arrest (Mar. 4. 2009) (ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issued a warrant for the
arrest of Omar Al Bashir).
81. See generally, Mary Kimani, Pursuit of justice or Western plot? International indictments
stir angry debate in Africa, AFRICAN RIENEWAL, Oct. 2009, at 12-15, http://www.un.org/
ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol23no3/ar-23no3-en-web.pdf (noting "After the AU announced that it
would not cooperate with the ICC, more than 130 civil society groups from 30 African countries
called on their governments to rethink their position.").
82. AU Assembly, Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementa-
tion of Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.270(XIV) on the Second Ministerial Meeting on the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Assembly/AU/Dec.296(XV), at 1, 5, Doc.
Assembly/AU/10(XV) (July 27, 2010, 15th Ordinary Session of the Assembly in Kampala).
83. Rome Statute, part 9, art. 86, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1,
2002).
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side of caution and assist the tribunal to fulfill its objectives as states
parties that are invested in its success. Of course, the matter remains
difficult, and as with many things in life, the final answer is not as
straightforward as initially appears.
What is clear at this stage is that there are important unresolved
questions about whether or not immunities continue to accrue to the
Sudanese leader in the face of the ICC arrest warrant vis-A-vis the
obligations of other (including third) states to arrest him and custom-
ary immunity law.84 Two answers have been offered. One is that im-
munities do not apply because they have been extinguished by the
Security Council referral which was based on Chapter VII. The sec-
ond, and seemingly better view, is that the Security Council - like
States - cannot do more than trigger investigations. 86 Thus, immuni-
ties will continue to apply until President Bashir is no longer in office,
except if the UN body explicitly removed immunity and imposed an
obligation on all states to cooperate with the tribunal, something that
the March 2005 referral resolution did not do. We can, of course, en-
visage some pronouncements from the Court on this issue in the fu-
ture. If that were to occur, we might reasonably expect for the judges
to hold that there is an obligation on the part of states to cooperate
with the ICC even if the Council did not explicitly remove Bashir's
immunity. Such decisions would have to be backed up with solid legal
reasoning to show African states and other countries why the ICC
position is the correct one as a matter of law.
Amidst these legal complexities, and as challenging as it is to pre-
dict how the ICC will handle the Sudanese, and now Libyan, hot pota-
toes handed to it by the Security Council, there is still a hopeful sign.
A recent decision by the AU Assembly seems to indicate that the AU
may channel its disagreements about current prosecutorial practice
and other concerns about the Court within, instead of outside, the
fledgling international justice system." This appears to be some, al-
beit faint, light at the end of a seemingly dark tunnel. It should be
welcomed by all of us working for justice for international crimes.
84. See generally, Dapo Akande, The Bashir Indictment: Are Serving Heads of State Im-
mune from ICC Prosecution, Oxford Transitional Justice Research Working Paper Series 87
(2008), available at http://www.fljs.org/uploads/documents/Justice-in Africa.pdf ; see also Dapo
Akande, The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and its Impact on Al Bashir's
Immunities, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 333 (2009); but see Paola Gaeta, Does President Al Bashir
Enjoy Immunity from Arrest?, 7 INT'L CRIM. JUST. 315 (2009).
85. Akande, supra note 84, at 2.
86. Jalloh, supra note 51, at 484.
87. See AU Assembly, Decision on the Implementation of Assembly Decision on the Abuse
of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, Assembly/AU/Dec.213(XII), at 1, Doc. Assembly/AU/
3(XII) (Feb. 1-3, 2009, 13th Ordinary Session of the Assembly in Sirte), available at http://au.int/
en/decisions/assembly.
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Meanwhile, in Sudan specifically, the establishment of an indepen-
dent High-Level Panel on Darfur is the most practical step adopted by
the AU to deal with this lingering puzzle. The High-Level Panel, led
by former South African President Thabo Mbeki,8" was precipitated
by the challenges that emerged from the ICC's indictment of Presi-
dent Bashir." The Panel was mandated among others to: "ex-
amine. . .how best the issues of accountability and combating
impunity, on the one hand, and reconciliation and healing on the
other, could be effectively and comprehensively addressed. . ."90
As you may know, the Mbeki High-Level Panel submitted its report
in October 2009.9' It recommended a hybrid court be established for
Darfur.92 It also underscored the interdependence between peace and
justice, and between justice and peace.93 It eschewed the one-size fits
all model. 94 The recommendations of the High-Level Panel will "con-
tribute to shaping the AU's response to the twin dilemmas of justice
and peace" in Sudan.95 This assumes that they will be implemented. I
certainly hope so. In turn, whatever they and we do about the Sudan,
including the ICC's involvement there, will give us a sense of what will
happen in the relationship between Africa and the ICC over the next
five to ten years.
Unfortunately, in recent developments, the AU has notched up the
rhetoric against the ICC. In addition to reiterating that it will not co-
operate with the Court or have its member states do so in respect of
the Bashir warrant, it has also signaled that it will take further action
by calling on all its states to speak with one voice."
For its part, the ICC and, in particular, its Prosecutor has proven
unwilling to show flexibility about the application of their mandate.
For example, under Article 53 of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor
88. African Union High-Level Panel of Darfur, Darfur: The Quest for Peace, Justice and
Reconciliation, PSC/AHG/2(CCVII), at i, (Oct. 29, 2009), available at http://www.darfurpanel.
org/resources/AUPD+Report+on+Darfur+$28Eng+$29+October+26+09.pdf.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id at 87-88. (noting "[t]he recommendations cover ... the role of UNAMID and the
African Union in consolidating peace in Darfur).
93. See id. (noting "[t]he recommendations cover ... the role of UNAMID and the African
Union in consolidating peace in Darfur).
94. See id.
95. A. Sarjoh Bah, Senior Fellow, N.Y. Univ. Ctr. on Int'l Cooperation, The African Union
and the Darfur Crisis: Regional Peacemaking in an era of International Justice, Presentation to
New York City Bar Association's Committee on African Affairs, at 4 (Oct. 5, 2006) (transcript
available at http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacekeeping/docs/bahNY%20Bar.pdf).
96. AU Assembly, Decision on the Report of the Second Meeting of States Parties to the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Assembly/AU/Dec.270(XIV), at 1, 9$ 6,
Doc. Assembly/AU/8(XIV)(Feb. 2, 2010, 14th Ordinary Session of the Assembly in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia).
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could suspend his investigations for one year by applying to the Pre-
Trial Chamber, asserting thereto that the interests of justice, which
arguably includes the interest of peace, demand this. But Ocampo
has insisted that he will not do so and that his job is to be a lawyer;
and that it is only for the Security Council to assess political impera-
tives.98 In other words, the measure of discretion granted textually to
the Prosecutor is ironically been given up by him in favor of passing
the decision on to another organ such as the United Nations. That is
most unfortunate, as it in many ways, weakens the position of the
prosecutorial organ which thereby loses more control over such
decisions.
In the end, we are left with a scenario where both sides have dug
their heels and refused to budge. This is unfortunate, since lost in all
of these debates, are the concerns of the hundreds of thousands of
victims of atrocities in Darfur. It is my sincere hope that we will move
past the current impasse, and move past it soon. For the victims of
crimes in Darfur deserve no less.
97. See Rome Statute, art. 53, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
98. See Interview with Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, International Criminal Court
(ICC), (July 7, 2007) available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=23120&Cr=
criminal&Crl=court. (Ocampo noted that, "[pleace negotiations can be long and complicated.
But I can't be involved in their aspects[,J . . . [tihe Security Council has noted that lasting peace
requires justice and it's my role to help in that. My duty is to end impunity and to contribute to
the prevention of future crimes").
2292012]
